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
29 September 1956



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
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# CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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## OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY



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DIA and DOS review(s) completed.

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# 1. FRENCH-BRITISH TALKS CHART FUTURE COURSE ON SUEZ ISSUE

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British ambassador Jebb informed Ambassador Dillon on 27 September that the French and British agreed in their talks in Paris that military action would be resorted to only in the event of either a major interruption of canal traffic or disturbances in Egypt which would convince British public opinion of the necessity for military action. They agreed to maintain their present military forces in the eastern Mediterranean.

The secretary general of the French Foreign Ministry also told Dillon there was no discussion of recourse to economic measures other than withholding tolls. The French and British ministers agreed that their resolution in the UN Security Council will call on Egypt to resume negotiations on the basis set forth by the Menzies committee.

## Comment

The French, who tend to blame the United States for current developments on the Suez question, appear to consider the talks as a means of cementing French-British solidarity. Some Frenchmen are urging greater emphasis on European unity, and Le Monde has suggested that a European bloc would be in a strong position to deal with other powers.

The American army attaché in London believes that the suspension of British plans to resort to force is reflected in the move on 28 September of elements of the British Third Infantry Division to home barracks from Southampton, where they had been awaiting sailing orders.

## 2. YUGOSLAV OFFICIALS DISCUSS STRONG DIFFERENCES WITH USSR

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Yugoslav foreign under secretary Prica told American chargé Hooker on 28 September that he did not believe Yugoslavia's ideological differences with the Soviet

Union could be surmounted, but he did believe Tito could exert some influence on the Soviet Union. It was on these grounds, he said, that Tito felt he could not refuse the invitation to return to the USSR with Khrushchev. This was especially true since Khrushchev "had engaged his prestige" in the policy of rapprochement with Yugoslavia and there were strong forces in the Soviet Union which questioned this policy.

Antun Vratusa, secretary to Vice President Kardelj, told the Italian ambassador on 28 September that Soviet-Yugoslav relations are at the lowest ebb for a long time, and it would be a great mistake to regard the present trips merely as friendly visits.

Yugoslav foreign secretary Popovic told British ambassador Roberts on 27 September that although Tito's trip to the USSR with Khrushchev "will make difficulties for President Eisenhower" in determining whether American aid should continue, "the need for the trip at this time was overriding."

### Comment

Khrushchev may well have indicated to Tito that there were very strong pressures in the Soviet leadership for clamping down on the Satellites and retreating from the "independent roads to socialism" concept. Tito may feel that there is a possibility of moderating these forces somewhat, thereby avoiding a falling-out with the Soviets at present.

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
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### 3. IRAQI PLANS TO ESTABLISH MILITARY SUPPLY BASE IN JORDAN

25X1A Comment on:

Iraqi premier Nuri Said told Ambassador Gallman on 27 September that Iraq cannot furnish Jordan arms or accede to King Hussain's request to station an Iraqi division in Jordan. He said Iraq would, however, establish a supply base at Mafraq, 35 miles north of Amman, for possible future use if Iraqi troops should be sent

there, and asked whether American arms aid might be endangered if Iraq had to "act in defense of Jordan." Nuri said a company or battalion of Iraqis would probably be sent to Mafraq to guard the supplies, and asked the United States to explain to Israel that this would be a purely defensive move.



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Iraq did not sign the armistice with Israel, which has indicated that stationing of Iraqi troops in Jordan would be considered a hostile act.

After earlier Jordanian appeals to Iraq, a small Iraqi troop concentration was established on the pipeline near the Syrian as well as the Jordanian border. This force, now about 3,000 troops, may be built up to divisional strength, but fear of Egyptian, Syrian and Saudi reaction as well as the Israeli warning will probably keep Iraq from moving any significant number of troops into Jordan at the present time. Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia suspect Iraq of having designs on Jordan and Syria. A high Syrian Foreign Ministry official told the US embassy in Damascus on 27 September that a movement of Iraqi forces into Jordan would result in a simultaneous entry of Egyptian and Syrian troops.

#### 4. ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT AGAINST SOUTH KOREA'S VICE PRESIDENT

##### Comment on:

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The attempted assassination of Vice President Chang Myon--a member of the Democratic Party--on 28 September will aggravate the political tension in

South Korea, which is characterized by acute struggles within both the opposition and government, investigations of political loyalties, widespread replacements in the army and government, and police harassment of the opposition. The attempt follows abandonment by the ruling Liberal Party of a plan to remove Chang from the line of succession to the presidency by a constitutional amendment, passage of which appeared doubtful.


There is no evidence which would directly connect the administration or the Liberal Party with the attempt, although it is clear that President Rhee is determined to rid himself of his unwelcome vice president. Rhee's close associates report that since the election last May he has become obsessed with the idea that the opposition is on the verge of taking over. [REDACTED]

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The assailant's statement that he was motivated by Chang's "pro-Japanese" attitude is a reference to the vice president's repeated criticism of the administration's extremist attitude toward Japan. [REDACTED]

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
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## 5. LEFT-WING FACTION MAY TAKE OVER BOLIVIAN GOVERNMENT

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The resignation of President Siles and the assumption of power by either the left-wing vice president Chavez or Senate president Lechin may be imminent, according to the American chargé in La Paz. The chargé bases his conclusion on the generally increased and aggressive interference of the Bolivian Workers' Confederation in affairs of the presidency.

*6-4*  
*1-3*  
The chargé considers it highly probable that left-wing, possibly Communist-dominated, elements of the confederation's leadership may be spearheading anti-Siles moves, using Lechin as a front. Meanwhile, [REDACTED] the disorders of 22 September were conceived and directed by Lechin in an effort to discredit Siles in preparation for replacing him with Chavez. The chargé comments that President Siles still commands wide popular support, but lacks organized and armed backers.

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### Comment

The struggle between left-wing elements of the National Revolutionary Movement led by Lechin and moderate elements led by President Siles has dominated Bolivian politics since the Movement came to power in 1952. The election of a congress last June showed that left-wing elements had somewhat greater political strength than the moderates. The left wing endorsed Siles for the presidency and had been expected to co-operate with his administration at least in the early months.

Lechin has long led the nation-wide Bolivian Workers' Confederation, which is generally anti-US and is Communist-infiltrated at certain levels.

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